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This article will explain Australia's attitudes and views on the East Timor issue which caused 
conflict with Indonesia. But on the other hand, Australia cannot ignore Indonesia's interests in East 
Timor. In 1978, Australia recognized East Timor "de facto" as part of Indonesia. Then, the question 
arises why Australia supports the integration of East Timor with Indonesia. What are the 
underlying interests. The Timor Gap Treaty was ratified on 11 December 1989, strengthening 
Indonesia's position with Australia. Indonesia is considered more accommodating when compared 
to Portugal in the matter of maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea region. Indonesia is the most 
important neighbor country for Australia. In terms of Australian defense, the Indonesian 
archipelago is a stronghold in northern Australia. This is based on Australia's interest in regional 
security free from the intervention of other hostile countries. Therefore, the importance of efforts 
to create government stability in Indonesia. The purpose of this study is to determine the dynamics 
of Australian foreign policy as seen from the Australian security and defense framework in looking 
at the East Timor issue. In addition, this research will discuss the Opposition to the Balibo 
Declaration and the Indonesian military intervention in East Timor which invites Australia's 
ambiguous attitude in addressing the integration of East Timor with Indonesia. Even though it was 
always at odds with Indonesia, Australia continued to prioritize its national interests in dealing 
with Indonesia. 
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The relationship between Indonesia and Australia that has existed for 70 years has 
experienced ups and downs since the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty on 27 December 1949. 
Indonesia in Australia's eyes is its most important neighbor and most strategic ally. However, the 
historical, cultural and economic differences between the two countries make relations "full of 
misunderstanding". A series of problems that have made the two countries tense are due to 
conflicts over a number of major issues that have occurred in recent years, such as the death penalty 
for Australian citizens in Indonesia in the 'Bali Nine' case and the arrest of Indonesian fishermen 
by Australian authorities related to rampant illegal fishing occurs and has not received special 
attention from the Indonesian government. After 21 years of the East Timor referendum on August 
30 (1999-2020), the issue of East Timor integration (1976-1999) was once an issue that caused the 
interruption of relations between the two countries. Even though East Timor is now independent, 
the East Timor issue is still interesting to discuss as part of Indonesia's history. Many groups of 
military elites in Indonesia were disappointed with the release of East Timor from Indonesia, 
because they had struggled to sacrifice body and soul to defend East Timor for 23 years. After the 
Dili Incident in 1991, Indonesia's position was increasingly cornered due to the intervention of 
foreign countries, especially Australia. This research is expected to provide a new perspective on 
the East Timor issue, particularly Indonesia's position in international forums. 
Through geopolitical and security approaches, Australia's foreign policy towards Indonesia 
is influenced by its geographical location bordering Indonesia on the Timor Sea. In looking at the 
East Timor problem, this research takes the point of view of Indonesia's position in the eyes of 
Australia from a geographical aspect. The geographic location of Indonesia which is in the 
northern part of Australia has an important meaning for Australia. Indonesia's position has had 
important consequences for Australia's security. The islands north of Australia form Australia's 
security border. 
This northern border or "Northern Belt" forms a strategic key to Australia's defense. In 
Australia's view, if the governing regime in power in Indonesia is hostile to Australia, then this is 
a direct threat to Australia's security and defense (Hilman Adil, 1993). Australia's perception of its 
northern region is based on Australia's fear of an invasion by other nations, particularly those of 
color (colored Asians). Philpott explained that the source of Australia's fear of its northern region 
came from the migration of Asian peoples to Australia in the 19th century and that experience was 
growing over time.1 The defeat of the white nation (Europe) with the nation of color (Asia) was  
                                                          
1 Karim Najjarine, “Australian Diplomacy Towards Indonesia 1965-1972: A Study of Fear in Australia Foreign 
Policy”, Australian Quarterly, vol.76, no.6 (Nov-Des., 2004), Australian Institute of Policy and Science, p.20. 
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marked by the Japanese victory against Russia in 1904-1905, the fall of the British base in 
Singapore by Japan in World War II, and the widespread influence of Chinese communists in Asia 
during the Cold War. Based on this experience, Australia sees that threats from the north can come 
from Indonesia or pass through the Indonesian archipelago. So that Indonesia has a strategic 
position for Australia, especially in the security and defense sector. 
The issue of East Timor which involved Indonesia was also a concern of Australia. There 
is concern Australia if East Timor becomes an independent country it will become a source of 
threat not only to Indonesia, but also Australia. Thus, Australia understands Indonesia's difficult 
position in not wanting the process and results of the decolonization in East Timor to cause 
disturbances and affect the stability of Indonesia and Southeast Asia.2 Australia's position in Asia-
Pacific has made Australia aware of its importance to play a strategic role, especially in Southeast 
Asia.3 Australia's presence in the Asia-Pacific region has caused its country to undertake a "two-
legged" foreign policy where it is active in associating with Asian nations and still does not forget 
its identity as a European nation in the Asia-Pacific region.  
Historically, Indonesia and East Timor were close relatives who separated due to the 
colonialism of the West. During the colonialism era, the Dutch and Portuguese divided the island 
of Timor into two regions, namely the western part controlled by the Dutch and the eastern part 
controlled by the Portuguese. Prior to the arrival of the Portuguese in East Timor, this area was the 
territory of the Goa Kingdom.4 However, the entry of Portugal has separated its countrymen. After 
the Balibo Declaration, Indonesia welcomed the desire of the East Timorese people to become part 
of Indonesia. However, Indonesia was faced with two difficult choices, namely to let East Timor 
become a civil war arena, which meant giving opportunities for other parties to use East Timor as 
a power base that would endanger Indonesia's security, or accept the pressure of the East Timorese 
people to join Indonesia. but with the risk that Indonesia will be criticized by Portugal in an 
international forum. 5  
The East Timor case thwarted the good relations between the two countries amidst the 
Australian Government's efforts to find a new role in the region in creating stability in Southeast 
Asia. PM Whitlam believes that stability in this region will be created with a number of countries 
that have a conducive level of economic and political stability. According to him, the right to self- 
                                                          
2 Djoened Poeponegoro, Marwati., Notosusanto, Nugroho. (Ed). 2010. Sejarah Nasional Indonesia. Jakarta: Balai 
Pustaka, p.629. 
3 Justus M. Van Der Kroef, Masalah Politik dan Keamanan Australia, (Jakarta: Tjandramerta, 1973), p.11. 
4 Angkatan Bersenjata, Juni 7, 1976. 
5 Ambar Wulan, Ed.,  Integrasi Timor Timur ke Dalam Wilayah NKRI 1976-1999,  (Jakarta: Bams 
Mediatama,2014), p.66 
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determination does not have to be "independence", but can also integrate with other countries. 
Whitlam believed that an independent East Timor would not be able to survive, because it would 
be a source of instability in the region. Also, there was not a single movement fighting for 
independence in the colony, apart from a terrorist movement that declared independence 




The author uses the historical method which consists of heuristic, criticism, interpretation, 
and historiography. The first stage is the collection of sources or heuristics. The heuristic process 
is searching primary and secondary sources. Primary sources come from the Australian Parliament; 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Department of Defence, National Archives of Australia; 
and National Library of Australia. Sources from Indonesia obtained from several newspapers 
published from Indonesia, such as Angkatan Bersendjata, Kompas, Berita Yudha, Sinar Harapan.  
The second stage is criticism to verify the appropriate data obtained. Furthermore, it is 
processed to determine the source most related to the research topic. At this stage, the author 
conducts internal criticism of the data used not only from Australian sources, but also from 
Indonesian sources. 
The third stage is interpretation. At this stage, the writer carries out the process of analyzing 
the data that has been collected from various sources to obtain accurate and objective historical 
facts. At this stage, caution is needed in assessing a source, because there is an element of 
subjectivity in it. Thus, the writer must be able to distinguish facts and opinions. At this stage, the 
writer must be able to judge objectively outside of personal or group interests. At this stage, the 
authors found that one of the facts based on the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
document, Australia did not recognize the Balibo Declaration. The Balibo incident is only 
described in connection with the shooting of five Australian journalists in October 1975 in Balibo. 
However, based on a document originating from Indonesia, it explains the events of the Balibo 
Declaration which stated East Timor's desire to integrate with Indonesia. This event is important 
to interpret, considering the beginning of East Timor's entry into Indonesian territory on July 17, 
1976. 
The last stage is historiography or history writing. At this stage the facts are also combined 
which are then described chronologically and scientifically. So that in the end a systematic and 
comprehensive writing is compiled, using references that have the right level of credibility. The  
                                                          
6 Alan Renouf, The Frightened Country, (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1979), inside Sunardi, Politik Luar Negeri 
Australia di bawah Partai Buruh. (Jakarta: Grafindo Utama, 1985), p.130. 
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initial discussion will explain Indonesia's attitudes and views towards Fretilin's Unilateral 
Independence and the Balibo Declaration; rejection of Australia's support for Fretilin's Unilateral 
Independence and the Balibo Declaration; Australia's interests in the Timor Gap; foreign policy 
within the framework of regional security; Australia's pro-contra stance on the integration of East 
Timor with Indonesia; the influence of the East Timor issue on Australia and Indonesia relations. 
 
INDONESIA'S ATTITUDES AND VIEWS OF THE UNILATERAL INDEPENDENCE OF 
FRETILIN AND THE BALIBO DECLARATION 
 
Changes in the situation in Portugal after the 1974 Flower Revolution and new 
developments in East Timor due to the escalating civil war in 1975, prompted the Indonesian 
Government to take a cautious stance and not interfere in the matter of East Timor based on Radio 
Australia's report on 28 August 1975 related to the attitude of the Indonesian government. 7 
However, a different attitude was shown by the Portuguese government that the chaotic situation 
caused by the decolonization of East Timor could not ignore Indonesia's role. Portugal asked for 
Indonesia's cooperation as mediator in the peace negotiations and the two countries agreed that the 
decolonization process in East Timor would take place peacefully and orderly. Foreign Minister 
Adam Malik and Portuguese Foreign Minister Antunes agreed that fundamental responsibility for 
the decolonization process in Portuguese Timor rests with Portugal as the legal ruler of the East 
Timor region.8 
Negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal were held three times, namely in London (29 
March 1975), Jakarta (29 August 1975), Rome (2-3 November 1975) and as a follow-up to the 
meeting in London, negotiations were held in Macao (26-28 June 1975) between delegations of 
the Portuguese Government, Apodeti, UDT, but Fretilin representatives were not present. The 
parties present regretted the absence of Fretilin which was seen as an attempt by Fretilin to prevent 
a joint agreement to be submitted to the Portuguese Government.9 However, after the negotiations 
the political situation in East Timor became increasingly out of control and sparked concern for 
Indonesia. 
In its diplomacy, Indonesia offered military assistance to the Portuguese to deal with the 
civil conflict there. However, the Portuguese response was less responsive and more concerned 
with the security of the Portuguese there than trying to reconcile the warring parties. 10 The meeting  
                                                          
7 Ambar Wulan, Ed.,  Op.cit., p.43. 
8 Sinar Harapan, November 4, 1975. 
9 Ambar Wulan, Ed.,  Op.cit., p.56-57. 
10 Ibid., p.61-62. 
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between Indonesia and Portugal in Rome resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). 
The Rome Memorandum, on the one hand, originated from the recognition of Portugal's rights and 
obligations as the legitimate government to carry out self-determination for the people of East 
Timor. On the other hand, the memorandum also accommodates interests and cooperation with 
Indonesia. Thus, this Memorandum aims not to internationalize the conflict in East Timor and 
prevent the involvement of other countries. The memorandum also attempted to resolve the 
refugee problem which is now a burden for Indonesia and the problem of 23 Portuguese detained 
by UDT. 11 In the MoU, the two countries agreed to bring the disputing parties to the negotiating 
table.12 The completion of the decolonization of East Timor by the Portuguese Government would 
not be carried out with one party only, but with all the parties in East Timor. Malik said, "Not only 
Fretilin but with all parties". Thus, the speed at which decolonization is carried out depends on 
the cooperation of all parties.13  
Indonesia believes that the stagnation of decolonization in East Timor is due to Fretilin 
being absent from the negotiations in Macao.14 However, in the midst of Indonesia's efforts to 
mediate between the warring parties to carry out further negotiations, Fretilin took unilateral action 
by proclamation Fretilin's Unilateral Declaration of Independence for Portuguese Timor  (UDI) on 
28 November 1975 Foreign Minister Adam Malik emphasized that the right to self-determination 
was not only a monopoly of Fretilin but also the rights of Apodeti, UDT, KOTA, Trabalhista.15  
Foreign Minister Adam Malik revealed that Fretilin's unilateral action was foolish and self-
defeating. Whereas further negotiations have been arranged, if not Bali, Darwin, Bangkok or 
Macau can return. "The best way they refuse, they are looking for a long way." However, according 
to the Indonesian government, the willingness to negotiate with Apodeti and UDT in Bali did not 
mean the two parties' refusal to negotiate. If Fretilin proposed another place to negotiate, then the 
two parties had the same right to propose another location.16 Indonesia was of the view that 
Fretilin's unilateral independence conflicted with Portugal's efforts to carry out the decolonization 
process in East Timor. Fretilin represents only one part of the East Timorese people and has  
 
                                                          
11 Sinar Harapan, “Tajuk Rencana:Dari Roma ke Atambua”, November 7, 1975. 
12 Ambar Wulan, Ed., Op.cit., p.66-67. 
13 Sinar Harapan, “Menlu Adam Malik mengungkapkan di Roma: Badan konsultasi Jakarta-Lisbon untuk percepat 
Dekolonisasi Timport”, November 4, 1975. 
14 Sinar Harapan, Keterampilan membela diri: termasuk perlindungan terhadap rakyat TimTim, 12 November 1975 
15 Berita Yudha, “Menlu Adam Malik: Fretilin harus menanggung akibatnya”, December 1,  1975. 
16 Sinar Harapan, “RI menyesalkan sikap Pemerintah Portugal atas tindakan sepihak Fretilin yang proklamasikan 
kemerdekaan Timor Timur”, November 29, 1975 
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prevented the resolution of the political conflict in East Timor.17 
Indonesia sent a letter through its ambassador in Lisbon asking the Portuguese 
Government's attitude towards Fretilin's unilateral independence. In response, Portugal would not 
recognize Fretilin's unilateral Declaration, but Portugal was obliged to assist Fretilin by providing 
military assistance. Portugal said it had been forced to accept this latter approach because 
Indonesia had assisted militarily to UDT and Apodeti.18 Indonesia concluded that the Portuguese 
Government was not responsible for Fretilin independence. The Portuguese representative at the 
UN, Antonio de Costa Lobo, was unable to normalize the situation in East Timor and asked the 
UN for cooperation in the implementation of the decolonization of East Timor.19 The Indonesian 
government regretted Portugal's attitude which violated the results of the Rome Negotiations that 
they would not bring the East Timor issue to the UN. Thus, the Indonesian Government concluded 
that the Portuguese Government had used the Rome Negotiations as a blanket to cover up its true 
political intentions.20  
Fretilin's unilateral independence was immediately responded to by the UDT and Apodeti 
declarations that East Timor was part of Indonesia through the "Balibo Declaration on 30 
November 1975". They asked the Government of Indonesia to accept the declaration and asked 
the Government of Indonesia to provide protection to them as Indonesian citizens. Indonesia will 
agree to the request contained in the Declaration that Portuguese Timor will become part of the 
Indonesian people and the Government of Indonesia has an obligation to protect its citizens.21 The 
actions of the four parties were a response to Fretilin's unilateral actions.22 Indonesia has come 
under international criticism after the Balibo Declaration. This was followed by Portugal's attitude 
showing contradictory attitudes towards Indonesia after the Rome Negotiations. Foreign Minister 
Adam Malik said that there was no need to pay attention to the views of Portugal and other 
countries and let people shout about the integration of East Timor with Indonesia.23  
Both Fretilin's unilateral proclamation of independence and the birth of the Balibo 
Declaration were due to the failure of the decolonization process in East Timor. Portugal, as a  
                                                          
17 Damien Browne, Vivianne Johnson,  Wendy Way, Eds.,  Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of East 
Timor 1974-1976, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2000), p.588. 
18 Damien Browne, Vivianne Johnson,  Wendy Way, Eds., Ibid.,p.588. 
19 Berita Yudha, “Portugal protes proklamasi Fretilin”, December 2, 1975. 
20 Berita Yudha, “RI sesalkan sikap Portugis: Timor Portugis diproklamasikan sebagai wilayah RI”, December 1, 
1975. 
21Damien Browne, Vivianne Johnson,  Wendy Way, Eds., Op.cit.,p.591. 
22 Berita Yudha, “Menlu Adam Malik penyelesaian Timport ditentukan difront”, December 3, 1975. 
23 Angkatan Bersenjata, “Menlu Adam Malik mengenai integrasi Tim Tim pada RI”, June 7, 1976. 
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sovereign state over East Timor, is considered not responsible for the East Timor problem and has 
left East Timor since August 10, 1975. Portugal failed to reconcile the warring parties there and 
asked Indonesian help to discuss this issue. For this reason, Indonesia rejected accusations of a 
military invasion of East Timor. Portugal allowed Fretilin to take over the power vacuum by using 
its weapons. All this time, the Portuguese tried to provoke Indonesia to invade East Timor, while 
the Portuguese could not maintain peace and order in East Timor. The Rome negotiations, which 
Portugal initially used to carry out the decolonization process, were eventually violated.24 
Indonesia's response in answering all allegations of Indonesian military intervention. The 
future of East Timor rests in the hands of the East Timorese people. On 17 December 1975 the 
“Temporary Administration of East Timor” (TAET) was formed, chaired by Arnaldo dos Reis 
Araujo. Thus, outsiders wishing to intervene in solving the East Timor problem, cannot ignore the 
existence of the TAET as a manifestation of the will of the East Timorese people. Regarding the 
existence of the Indonesian military in East Timor, they were volunteers who came at the request 
of the people through Apodeti, UDT, Kota, Trabalhista and this could not be prevented by the 
Indonesian government. So the resolution of the Security Council regarding the withdrawal of 
Indonesian troops is irrelevant, because the withdrawal of volunteers is in the hands of the people 
and the TAET. 25 
Indonesia has contributed to advancing prosperity in East Timor, but subsequent 
developments in East Timor show a contradiction for Indonesia. There was criticism of Indonesia's 
own actions in East Timor. Indonesia is considered to have carried out the wrong strategy at the 
start of the East Timor problem. After the 1975 Balibo Declaration, Indonesia should no longer 
have direct contact with Portugal, but with East Timor and the UN directly. What Indonesia was 
doing helped Portugal maintain its position as the legitimate administrative authority in East 
Timor. Therefore, Indonesia's actions are considered a "failure of diplomacy" (Basilio Dias 
Araujo: 2016).  
However, despite these criticisms, what is being done by Indonesia as part of an effort to 
safeguard its sovereignty for the creation of national development. The problem of East Timor 
refugees to Indonesian territory is because based on the provisions of the GBHN, national stability 





                                                          
24 Damien Browne, Vivianne Johnson,  Wendy Way, Eds., Op.cit.,p.590. 
25 Sinar Harapan, “RI sesalkan resolusi DK PBB mengenai masalah Timor Timur”, December 24, 1975. 
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REJECTION OF AUSTRALIAN SUPPORT FOR FRETILIN'S UNILATERAL 
INDEPENDEBCE AND THE BALIBO DECLARATION 
 
Australia was the first country that did not recognize the UDI (Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence for Portuguese Timor). Before Fretilin unilaterally declared the establishment of the 
"Democratic Republic of East Timor" on 28 November 1975, Fretilin and UDT formed a coalition 
on 21 January 1975, but disbanded on 27 May 1975. On 15 August 1975, Fretilin launched a 
military rebellion and succeeded in occupying the Armed Forces Training Center (the Armed 
Forces Training Center) on August 18, 1975.26 Australia refused to assist the Fretilin 
Administration in Dili after successfully defeating UDT which had retreated to Atauro.27  
PM Whitlam refused to give support to Fretilin before Fretilin finally proclaimed its 
independence unilaterally on 28 November 1975. Australia had offered Darwin as negotiations 
between Portugal and representatives of the Fretilin party, but Australia was open to other options 
regarding a place to negotiate if it wanted to be in Macau or Lisbon. But, from the start Australia's 
bid did not appear to be successful, Whitlam said "whoever wants to win and who will win, will 
not come".28 When Fretilin Foreign Affairs Spokesman Ramos Horta visited Australia to negotiate 
with PM Whitlam, Fretilin had threatened to follow Frelimo's lead in Mozambique to take control 
of East Timor if Australia refused to support Fretilin. However, Australia in its position offered 
the option of a ceasefire and ending the civil war in East Timor.29 
Australia's refusal to support Fretilin was based on the view that it could not accept the 
claim by one of Timor's three main parties as the only true representative of Portuguese Timor. 
Likewise with the claims of anti-Fretilin parties against the Balibo Declaration. Based on 
documents from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, it is stated that the Balibo 
Declaration was initiated by a secret meeting between leaders of the anti-Fretilin party and 
Indonesian representatives in Bali.30 Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock stated before 
parliament on November 29, 1975, that it did not recognize the establishment of the Democratic 
Republic of East Timor and the Balibo Declaration to integrate with Indonesia, but the Australian 
Government still recognized Portuguese sovereignty in Portuguese Timor and continued to support  
 
                                                          
26 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, East Timor. Final Report of The Senate Committees on 




30 Damien Browne, Vivianne Johnson,  Wendy Way, Eds., Op.cit.,p.588. 
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negotiations between Portugal and East Timor's political parties. 31  
A different opinion came from the Australian Embassy in Indonesia, which gave another 
view in formulating Australian policy towards Indonesia. Australian Ambassador Woolcott raised 
doubts about self-determination. In reality, there were only two choices, namely recognizing 
Fretilin power or the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. In addition, Woolcott expressed 
Indonesia's opinion that the failure to decolonize East Timor was caused by Portugal's mistakes. It 
is in Australia's interest to cooperate better with Indonesia than with Portugal.32 
 
AUSTRALIAN INTERESTS IN THE TIMOR GAP 
 
Australia's interest in supporting the integration of East Timor with Indonesia is not only 
based on geopolitical interests seen from the position of Australia's northern region bordering the 
Timor Sea, but also economic interests in the Timor Gap. The potential for oil in the Timor Gap 
has attracted great Australian interest in the Timor Sea. Therefore, it was in Australia's interest for 
Indonesia to draw East Timor into an integral part of its territory. Therefore, the issue would be 
easier to consolidate with Indonesia than with an independent East Timor or with the Portuguese.  
Indonesia's soft attitude towards Australia's interests in the Timor Sea led to the birth of 
the "Timor Gap Treaty" which was detrimental to Indonesia. But on the other hand, Australia gave 
the green light for Indonesia to take over East Timor with all the conditions. The integration of 
East Timor with Indonesia must be exchanged dearly where Indonesia has not only lost potential 
natural resources there, but has threatened Indonesia's sovereign territory. (Ferdi Tanoni: 2008). 
Timor Gap cooperation is an important milestone for Australia-Indonesia relations. From 
an economic point of view, the two countries will benefit greatly from mining the seabed which 
contains large deposits of oil. From a political perspective, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said "the 
agreement is important because it is Australia's" de jure "recognition of the integration of East 
Timor with Indonesia".33 
The agreement itself is unique, although there has not been an agreement on maritime 
boundaries between the two countries. However, it was agreed to not waste natural resources. 
From a political point of view, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas comments were not exaggerated that 
the agreement was a victory of ratio over emotions and had a positive aim in the relationship 
between the two countries. Meanwhile, according to Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, this is an  
 
                                                          
31 Ibid., p.591. 
32 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Op.cit., p.129. 
33 Kompas, “RI-Australia menandatangani ratifikasi Perjanjian Celah Timor”, December 11, 1989. 
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important agreement in 40 years of relations between the two countries.34 The zone of cooperation 
in the East Gap is a temporary arrangement intended to allow the two countries to exploit oil 
resources in the zone, without waiting for an agreement to be reached on the boundaries of the 
continental shelf of the two countries in the area whose negotiations have long been deadlocked. 
Indeed, the two countries still find it difficult to reach an agreement to determine the 
boundary line between the two countries, due to differences in perceptions. So a creative and 
positive path was sought for mutual benefit which resulted in the Timor Gap Treaty. This is a 
creative solution not only because it can overcome psychological barriers and differences in 
perceptions, but also provides benefits for both countries in exploring for oil in the Timor Gap.35 
Former Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja in the Seminar "Prospects of Petroleum 
Cooperation in the Context of Development of the Indonesia-Australia Border Area on December 
13, 1989", said that "This is the first time in this world that an area disputed by the two countries 
has finally agreed to be jointly managed sam. The mechanism is regulated by a body that is 
overseen by the two governments in an equal manner of sharing. And still enforce the legal 
provisions that apply in both countries ". According to Mochtar, the agreement on the cooperation 
zone in the Timor Gap is not a division of jurisdiction by the two countries, but only a practical 
arrangement that allows the two countries to utilize the existing oil resources in the Timor Gap, 
without having to wait for the settlement of the continental shelf boundary.36 
The hope of the Timor Gap Treaty was conveyed by Frans Seda who proposed to the 
Australian and Indonesian Ministers that a fund for the development of Timor, West and East was 
formed from this authority. Furthermore, Darwin will be used as one of the technical bases, so that 
Darwin will be developed as well as a center for developing the southeastern part of eastern 
Indonesia ”. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said "The Timor Gap Treaty will help the development of 
the eastern part of Indonesia, including East Timor, because the area will get economic benefits".37  
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said that the Timor Gap cooperation had turned the conflict 
situation into an important cooperation situation. This is important given the potential for conflict 
in the last ten years. Negotiating border lines is actually still difficult because the principle 
approaches of the two countries are different. Cooperation in the Timor Gap is a first event in the 
world because of the shape of the cooperation area. Until now, Indonesia and Australia have not  
                                                          
34 Kompas, “Tajuk Rencana : Kerjasama Celah Timor hasil sekaligus pemacu hubungan RI-Australia”, December 
14,1989. 
35 Kompas, “Disusuli tepuk tangan dan minum sampanye: Perjanjian RI-Australia tentang zona kerjasama Celah 
Timor ditandatangani”, December 12, 1989. 
36 Kompas, “Kerjasama Celah Timor memantapkan keamanan”, December 14, 1989. 
37 Kompas, Op.cit., December 12, 1989. 
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been able to agree to determine the boundaries of the continental shelf.38 Both Alatas and Evans 
emphasized the importance of this collaboration as a symbol of friendship, Evans said because this 
was proof that a dispute could be avoided by "sensible political management", while Alatas called 
it "the victory of the ratio over emotions". At the end of 1988, Indonesia and Australia both 
received a new Foreign Minister who shared an "international" view. The two Foreign Ministers 
agreed to take a new, more concrete approach, so that it doesn't focus too much on negative things, 
such as press and fishermen issues.39 
 
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF REGIONAL SECURITY 
 
Australia's policy towards the decolonization of East Timor was based on Australia's 
security interests. Indonesia and Australia have the same interests and responsibilities in terms of 
the development of East Timor, namely maintaining national stability and security as part of 
regional or international safeguards.40 
Indonesian Defense Minister Maraden Panggabean asked Australia for approval regarding 
Indonesia's actions in East Timor, because Indonesia had to face 40,000 refugees from East Timor. 
In this position, Indonesia is trying to adjust its strategy in East Timor to be compatible with 
Australia's foreign policy. In terms of security, Indonesia emphasized that Australia cannot act 
independently. Geographically, Australia is part of the Southeast Asia region, so it is necessary to 
coordinate its approach to regional issues with countries in the region.41 
The achievement of the Indonesia-Australia cooperation agreement in the Timor Gap (Oil 
and gas natural resources) has a positive impact on security stability between the two countries, 
especially in the Asia-Pacific region. The agreement had an impact on Australia's de jure 
recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. In addition, Indonesia-Australia 
cooperation in the Timor Gap has enriched the country's practice of temporary arrangements as 
defined in the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982.42 
Australia's state security can be achieved not only through military defense, but through a 
“multidimensional” cooperative approach. This policy is a historic event because for the first time 
Australia has given top priority to Indonesia, even though Indonesia is not a major trading partner. 
Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans said before the Australian Parliament (6 December  
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39 Kompas, “Memantau Hubungan RI dengan Australia”, December 30, 1989. 
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1989) that the Australian Foreign Policy entitled "Australian Regional Security” (KRA) is 
important because it emphasizes that Australia's security can be achieved in seven ways. 
Previously Australia's security relied solely on the Australian Armed Forces (ADF), according to 
the 1987 White Paper.43 
Australia's Foreign Policy entitled “Australian Regional Security” (KRA) aims to “Protect 
Australian security” by maintaining positive security in the strategic environment in our region ”. 
Meanwhile, what is meant by "our region" includes the regions of Southeast Asia and the South 
Pacific. Previously Australia's security relied solely on the Australian Defense Force (ADF), 
according to the 1976 and 1987 White Papers issued by the Australian Department of Defense. 
With the issuance of the “Regional Security Policy”, Australia provides a concrete role for the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in maintaining Australia's security. 
Calling the ADF is one of the seven ways to maintain Australia's security. So far, the ADF has 
been accused of playing too much role in Australian foreign policy through its white paper. With 
this policy, the roles of DFAT and ADF Australia strike a balance.44 
In the Continental Defense strategy, efforts are very much emphasized in maintaining 
regional stability in the Southeast Asian region, including the East Timor region which is in the 
Indonesian Archipelago. Therefore, the independence of East Timor will be a source of instability 
in the Northern region of Australia. Australia will find it difficult to carry out bilateral cooperation 
with a country that does not yet have political and economic stability. In addition, the use of 
military methods adopted by Indonesia in dealing with the Portuguese Timor issue aimed at 
creating regional stability did not endanger Australia's security interests, but only disrupted good 
Australia-Indonesia relations.45 In the case of Portuguese Timor, Australia's defense interest was 
to support the integration of East Timor, but with conditions that Indonesia had to follow. Also, 
Australian defense supports the independence of East Timor, but with the condition of a security 
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AUSTRALIA'S PRO-CONS ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE INTEGRATION OF EAST 
TIMOR WITH INDONESIA 
 
Based on Australian media reports on November 26, 1975 regarding the coverage of the 
Indonesian military in East Timor, the Australian Government received strong protests from the 
people, regardless of whether the allegations were true or not.47 Foreign Minister Adam Malik said 
“There will be no Indonesian invasion of Portuguese Timor. Apart from the sizeable Indonesian 
assistance for UDT / APODETI troops in Portuguese Timor ”. Indonesia asked Australia and 
friendly countries to support Indonesia's difficult position. Australian statements that do not 
support UDI in front of the Australian media are very important for Indonesia. 48 After the outbreak 
of fighting between UDT and Fretilin in August 1975, Ambassador Woolcott explained Australia's 
policy not to get too involved in Indonesia's affairs with East Timor. If Indonesia intervenes in 
East Timor, Australia's policy is to make plans to minimize criticism that has emerged in Australia 
and to demonstrate an understanding of Indonesia's position to the public in Australia.49 
Australia's view of Indonesia's military action through "Operation Seroja" on 7 December 
1975, was aimed at securing the integration of East Timor with Indonesia by providing military 
assistance to anti-Fretilin forces. Meanwhile, Indonesia's determination to carry out this military 
operation will not affect the anti-Indonesian attitude in Australia and the former Portuguese 
colonies in Africa as part of Indonesia's national interests. Indonesia asked Australia to understand 
Indonesia's position and work to curb the anti-Indonesian movement in Australia in the long-term 
interests of the two countries. The military action to take over East Timor was unanimous and in 
accordance with the provisions of the applicable law.50 Therefore, Australia cannot do anything 
except support Indonesia's decision. 
The issue of East Timor is an obstacle in the relationship between Australia and Indonesia. 
Moreover, there are many groups and groups in Australia who oppose the entry of East Timor with 
Indonesia. The debate regarding the integration of East Timor with Indonesia, was not limited to 
the opposition and government circles, but sparked debate within the Australian community itself. 
The attitude of the Australian public towards the anti-Indonesian movement, especially among 
Australian academics. Herbert Feith gave his opinion that Indonesia's condition was unstable and 
predicted that there would be a rebellion in Indonesia in the next ten years. He also supported the 
propaganda carried out by Fretilin supporters. Herbert Feith is known as an anti-Indonesian  
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academic. However, not all academics and researchers in Australia show an anti-Indonesian 
attitude. There are also those who oppose the anti-Indonesian attitude, as was done by participants 
of the “Asian Studies Association of Australia” Conference which was held on May 14-16, 1976 
at the University of Melbourne condemning an Australian student who had shown an anti- 
Indonesia in his speech in front of the conference participants.51 
Then, the counter attitude towards Indonesia in the East Timor issue, especially among 
Australian waterside workers.52 Australian waterside workers refuse to unload from Indonesian 
ships due to Indonesia's interference in the civil war in East Timor. Criticism of Indonesia was also 
shown by demonstrations accompanied by vandalism, especially from supporters of Fretilin, the 
"Friends of Fretilin" in Australia. They voiced, "Indonesia should not interfere in the affairs of 
East Timor" in front of the Indonesian Embassy in Australia.53 
As a result of the boycott of Indonesian ships in Australia, Minister of Transportation Emil 
Salim asked the Ocean shipping company PT Djakarta Lyold to suspend all their commercial 
shipping to Australia until the boycott by port workers in Australia against Indonesian ships was 
stopped.54 The Indonesian Ambassador to Indonesia Her Tasning reacted to the demonstration and 
boycott of Indonesian ships in Australia. This was because Australian workers supported Fretilin's 
struggle for independence. They did not know that Fretilin was not the only party representing the 
Timorese people. The demonstrations in Australia are considered by Indonesia to come from the 
left, including those from the "Campaign for independence East Timor" and the "Australian Union 
of Students". Indonesia considered that the Australian mass media acted unilaterally by only 
reporting on Fretilin activities. PM Whitlam is aware of his party's leftist interests in supporting 
the independence of East Timor. However, Australia assured Indonesia that East Timor was not 
the main problem in Australian politics. As a result, the Australian Government permitted 
Indonesian action to some extent in East Timor.55 
In early 1975, developments in East Timor expanded and attracted the world press. The 
Fretilin-influenced press carried offensive reporting against Indonesia. A tendentious report stated 
that Indonesia was preparing to attack East Timor. Indonesia protested against reports from the 
Singapore newspaper, the Sydney Herald and the Tribune of an Indonesian protest against 
Australian submarines and aircraft that were considered to be stalking Indonesian troops in Timor.  
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However, Indonesia did not confirm the news, because "Indonesia already knew about the 
Australian aircraft and there was no protest from the Indonesian side".56 Indonesia considers the 
Australian mass media to be anti-Indonesian. 
Seeing the large amount of Fretilin support in Australia, Indonesia was not worried about 
Fretilin propaganda in Darwin. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas considered that the number of 
demonstrators was not large and only spoke when the media passed. Ali Alatas questioned the 
democracy demanded by Fretilin supporters. According to him, democracy meant representing the 
opinion of the majority while they only represented a handful of Fretilin members. 57 Indonesia 
regretted the attitude of Fretilin supporters in Australia who did not understand the importance of 
the future of East Timor and Indonesia.58 
The Australian public criticized Australia's foreign policy during the Whitlam 
Administration for showing an ambiguous attitude. Especially in terms of self-determination or 
incorporation.59 This criticism was also conveyed by Pritchett, who is the First Assistant Secretary, 
Strategic and International Policy, Department of Defense conveyed his criticism to the Minister 
of Defense Bill Morrison. Pritchett considered the policy to incorporate East Timor into Indonesia 
as inappropriate because it was carried out by force. Because of the overwhelming evidence from 
the start that any act of self-determination would oppose integration.60 Mr Pritchett was of the 
opinion that Indonesia had to get rid of Fretilin in order to achieve integration. It seems that 
political negotiations will not succeed in achieving this goal. Political negotiations will not 
succeed, so strong coercion and encouragement are needed and these cannot be hidden from the 
Australian public. Pritchett supported the line of defense policy, namely the acceptance of an 
independent state in Portuguese Timor. 61 
Dr James Goodman, in a hearing in the Australian parliament, saw a contradiction in 
Australia's foreign policy towards Indonesia in the East Timor issue. The Australian government 
recognized the right of the East Timorese people to self-determination, but recognized Indonesia's 
claim to sovereignty in East Timor by giving the green light to the Indonesian military. In fact, if 
the East Timorese people had the right to self-determination, the entry of the Indonesian military 
into East Timor would be illegal. Australia's recognition of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor 
has shown that the right to self-determination for the East Timorese people is a secondary  
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consideration that is pragmatic rather than legal. Thus, Goodman considers that this policy 
prevents the Australian Government from taking a proactive role in East Timor. 62 
 
THE EFFECT OF THE EAST TIMOR PROBLEM ON AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA 
RELATIONS 
 
Australia is faced with a choice that is difficult to avoid, namely integration and its 
relationship with Indonesia, on the other hand support for Fretilin and Indonesia's immoral actions 
in East Timor. As a result, the government faces one of the problems in foreign relations, namely 
a choice between being pragmatic towards national interests and being realistic about what 
happens.63  
Australian Ambassador Woolcott conveyed Indonesia's position on the East Timor issue 
to Australian Foreign Minister Willesee that allegations of Indonesian military intervention in East 
Timor were false.64 What Woolcott said is an important consideration for the Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs. This view was conveyed by PM Malcom Fraser stated in front of 
the Australian Parliament that Australia had a very strong interest in maintaining a close 
relationship with Indonesia, apart from our stance on East Timor.65 
In addition, Woolcott told Indonesia regarding Australian foreign policy that the Australian 
Government really did not mind if the East Timorese wanted to join Indonesia. The Australian 
Government has explained to its people about developments in East Timor. Woolcott said "both 
the Whitlam and Fraser governments have the same opinion about East Timor, if the demand to 
join Indonesia is the will of the people there, it's up to them, the Australian Government has no 
objection".66 Thus, the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia plays an important role in maintaining 
good relations between the Australian Government and Indonesia. 
The Speaker of the Australian Parliament Billy Snedden during his visit to East Timor in 
1979, said that East Timor, which is already part of the Republic of Indonesia, is a fact..67 Australia 
is confident that the incorporation of East Timor into RI territory will bring prosperity to the East  
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Timorese people. The Australian people and government will assist in the implementation of 
development in East Timor in order to create prosperity for the people of East Timor. To improve 
Australia-Indonesia relations, Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock announced that the 
Australian Government would increase Australia's aid program for 1976/1977 for Indonesia. 
Australia has an obligation to provide assistance to developing countries in their efforts to improve 
the economic and social conditions of their people. After Papua New Guinea, our obligations are 
for Indonesia. Australia will provide assistance totaling $ A 86 million.68 
Along the way, Australia and Indonesia relations did not go smoothly. Tensions arose 
between the two countries during the process towards legalizing the merger of East Timor and 
Indonesia in 1976. The suspicious attitude shown by Indonesia to Australia showed a contradiction 
to Indonesia, namely during PM Fraser's visit to China in 1976, when the relationship between 
Indonesia and China was at odds. 69 Moreover, since the beginning of October 1974, the Maoist 
movement began to increase in East Timor. Indonesia is concerned about the spread of anti-
Indonesian propaganda by the left.70 However, the Australian Government immediately responded 
to this tension to respect Indonesia's position. Prime Minister Fraser dismissed suggestions that 
Australia had taken a hostile stance with Indonesia in its talks with China. PM Fraser said that he 
personally respected President Soeharto and the efforts made for his country.71 
Regarding the Change of Government in Australia from PM Whitlam to PM Fraser, 
Foreign Minister Adam Malik assessed that the change of leaders would not change the Australia-
Indonesia relationship in the East Timor issue.72 Indonesian Ambassador to Australia Her Tasning 
said: “Whoever is in power there, be it the Labor Party or the Liberal Party. The two parties 
consider relations with Indonesia important. Likewise with the problem of East Timor. Both parties 
want an orderly, orderly and peaceful settlement of decolonization ”.73 The Indonesian 
Ambassador to Singapore Her Tasning (Former Indonesian Ambassador to Australia) said that the 
East Timor issue did not significantly affect the good relations between Indonesia and Australia. 
Although, the Fretilin movement in that country had received great attention there, but its influence 
was not great among the Australian community and the Australian Government. According to Her 
Tasning, the supporters of the Fretilin movement were mostly spearheaded by the left, so that his  
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efforts to seek support had to be carried out secretly and only contacted certain people.74  
Deputy Bakin Ali Murtopo explained that the East Timor problem would not tear the 
relationship between Australia and Indonesia. There is a bigger problem than the East Timor affair 
related to cooperation to maintain Asia-Pacific stability where Australia is very dominant and it is 
in our common interest. Meanwhile, Japan in the northern region also has dominance in this area.75 
Entering the 1990s, the relationship between Australia and Indonesia was tense again. The 
Santa Cruz Incident in Dili on 12 November 1991 had made relations between Australia and 
Indonesia heated up again. This is because this incident made Indonesia's position difficult. 
Indonesia is increasingly being criticized by the international community. Ali Alatas stated that 
the Dili Incident occurred at the same time as increasing global attention to human rights. The 
reaction was also exacerbated by a number of provocative foreign media and NGOs, mainly from 
Portugal, who took advantage of this incident for its political purpose, namely to corner 
Indonesia.76 
Australia as one of the Intergovernmental Groups on Indonesia (IGGI) countries reacted 
violently to Indonesia. Moreover, there have been two countries that have stated that they will 
suspend their assistance to the Republic of Indonesia, namely the Netherlands and Canada. The 
Dili incident on 12 November 1991 had an impact on development fund donor countries that were 
members of the IGGI who would suspend their assistance to Indonesia. If this assistance is stopped, 
it is feared that a domino effect will spread to a number of other donor countries that will do the 




Indonesia and East Timor were reunited when East Timor struggled to escape Portuguese 
colonial rule for approximately 450 years. Indonesia plays an important role in the East Timor 
issue, because Indonesia has ethnic and cultural ties with East Timor. Thus, the entry of East Timor 
to the release of East Timor from Indonesia is an important lesson for the long history of the 
Indonesian nation. Fretilin's unilateral independence and the declaration of the merger of East 
Timor with Indonesia drew criticism and support for Indonesia. Apart from all that, Indonesia has 
been instrumental in preparing East Timor for a new future. The process towards all of these must 
be appreciated both in Indonesia and internationally. For 23 years, Indonesia has helped East  
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Timor to be ready to become an independent country, even though it had to join to become part of 
Indonesia first. Indonesia without East Timor can still live, but East Timor without Indonesia is 
nothing. Indonesia's contribution to the process of decolonization of East Timor failed as a result 
of Fretilin's uncooperative attitude that was absent from the Macao negotiations and was followed 
by Portugal's irresponsibility in its colony. Thus, the decolonization process in a peaceful and 
peaceful manner could not be carried out according to plan. 
Indonesia succeeded in overcoming one hurdle in gaining international recognition of 
Indonesian sovereignty, particularly from Australia. The signing of the Timor Gap Treaty in 1989 
was the glue between the two countries, which was heated and cold due to the East Timor problem. 
Both Indonesia and Australia have an equal interest in the rich potential of natural resources in the 
Timor Gap. The region is a source of dispute regarding the border between the two countries in 
exploring the natural wealth there. 
Australia and Indonesia have the same interest in maintaining each other's security, even 
though the East Timor issue makes relations between the two countries suspicious of each other. 
Australia sees the East Timor issue as part of regional stability and security. In order to achieve its 
goals, Australia has shown a "ambivalent attitude", on the one hand it respects the criticism of the 
Australian people towards Indonesia, but on the other hand it has to accept the fact that East Timor 
is not ready to become an independent country. The views of the Australian Embassy in Indonesia 
are an important basis for the formulation of the Australian Government's Foreign Policy. 
Woolcott succeeded in connecting a common thread between Indonesia's interests and Australia's 
interests in order to create a common agreement regarding the East Timor issue. 
Indonesia seeks to get support from countries in the Asia-Pacific region, especially 
Australia. The entry of East Timor refugees into Indonesian territory as a result of the Fretilin 
attack was a condition that disturbed national stability and security that the Indonesian Government 
had to face and if left without a solution would disturb the stability of wider security. So that 
Indonesia has a strategic position for Australia, especially in the security and defense sector. 
The issue of security is one of the most important issues facing Australia. In order to 
maintain regional stability, especially in the Asia-Pacific, Australia left the comfort zone of its 
nation as a Westerner and merged with the Asian and Melanesian nations of the region. Not with 
the exception of Indonesia's domestic affairs in the East Timor issue, Australia has played a minor, 
but very influential role for Indonesia. Especially Australia's 'de jure' recognition of Indonesia's 
sovereignty over East Timor. 
The Australian Government is working to improve relations and cooperation with 
Indonesia. However, on the other hand, the country is faced with domestic problems, namely How 
to disseminate and give understanding to the wider community and its institutions, especially the  
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mass media? Different political systems and different cultures often create misunderstandings. The 
attention of the Australian public to East Timor has not completely disappeared. Australian society 
demands a concrete improvement in the lives of the people of East Timor. The Australian and 
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